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GENERICITY FOR MATHIAS FORCING OVER GENERAL
TURING IDEALS
PETER A. CHOLAK, DAMIR D. DZHAFAROV, AND MARIYA I. SOSKOVA
Abstract. In Mathias forcing, conditions are pairs (D, S) of sets of natu-
ral numbers, in which D is finite, S is infinite, and maxD < minS. The
Turing degrees and computational characteristics of generics for this forcing
in the special (but important) case where the infinite sets S are computable
were thoroughly explored by Cholak, Dzhafarov, Hirst, and Slaman [2]. In
this paper, we undertake a similar investigation for the case where the sets
S are members of general countable Turing ideals, and give conditions under
which generics for Mathias forcing over one ideal compute generics for Mathias
forcing over another. It turns out that if I does not contain only the com-
putable sets, then non-trivial information can be encoded into the generics for
Mathias forcing over I. We give a classification of this information in terms of
computability-theoretic properties of the ideal, using coding techniques that
also yield new results about introreducibility. In particular, we extend a re-
sult of Slaman and Groszek and show that there is an infinite ∆0
3
set with no
introreducible subset of the same degree.
1. Introduction
Mathias forcing gained prominence in set theory in the article [9], for whose
author it has come to be named. In a restricted form, it was used even earlier
by Soare [12], to build an infinite set with no subset of strictly higher Turing
degree. In computability theory, it has subsequently become a prominent tool for
constructing infinite homogeneous sets for computable colorings of pairs of integers,
as in Seetapun and Slaman [10], Cholak, Jockusch, and Slaman [3], and Dzhafarov
and Jockusch [5]. It has also found applications in algorithmic randomness, in
Binns, Kjos-Hanssen, Lerman, and Solomon [1]. Dorais [4] has studied a variant of
Mathias forcing that behaves nicely with respect to reverse mathematics.
The conditions in Mathias forcing are pairs (D,S), where D is a finite subset of
ω, S is an infinite such subset, and maxD < minS. A condition (D∗, S∗) extends
(D,S) if D ⊆ D∗ ⊆ D∪S and S∗ ⊆ S. We think of the finite set D as representing
a commitment of information, positive and negative, about a (generic) set to be
constructed, and E as representing a commitment of negative information alone.
In computability theory, the interest is typically in Mathias forcing with an
imposed effectivity restriction on the conditions used. For instance, in [3, Theorem
4.3], the sets S are restricted to be computable, whereas in [10, Theorem 2.1], the
sets are restricted to be members of a Scott set. Many other variants have appeared
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in the literature. The most general requirement of this form is to restrict the sets
S to be members of a fixed countable Turing ideal I.
Our interest in this paper will be in the computability-theoretic properties of
generics for the above forcing. A similar analysis for the special case when I
consists just of the computable sets was undertaken by Cholak, Dzhafarov, Hirst,
and Slaman [2]. As we shall see, this situation differs from the general one in a
number of important ways. For instance, given a non-computable set A, it is always
possible to choose a generic for Mathias forcing over the computable ideal that does
not compute A. We characterize those sets A and ideals I that have this property,
and construct ones that do not. Thus, we show there are ideals I over which every
Mathias generic contains some common non-computable information.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give formal definitions of
Mathias forcing, and in particular, of how we choose to represent conditions. Sec-
tion 3 establishes some basic results and constructions. In Section 4, we turn to
the computational strength of generics for Mathias forcing, focusing on the prob-
lem mentioned above, of which sets are necessarily computed by them. Finally, in
Section 5, we compare generics across different ideals.
2. Background
Throughout, sets will refer to subsets of ω. We shall use standard terminology
from computability theory, and refer the reader to Soare [13] for background. For
a general introduction to forcing in arithmetic, see Shore [11, Section 3].
Definition 2.1. A (Turing) ideal is a collection I of sets closed under ≤T and ⊕.
In this paper we shall be looking at countable ideals only, and so shall avoid
explicitly mentioning so henceforth. The simplest ideal is COMP , consisting of
all the computable sets, which is of course a sub-ideal of every other ideal. The
next simplest example of an ideal is a principal one, consisting of all A-computable
sets for some set A. We denote this ideal by [A]≤T (so that COMP = [A]≤T for
any computable set A), and note that it can be identified with the set of indices
of total A-computable functions, so membership in it is a Σ03(A) relation of sets.
Though not every ideal is principal, more general ideals can be presented in a similar
way.
Theorem 2.2 (Kleene and Post [8]; Spector [15]). Every ideal I has an exact pair,
i.e., a pair of sets A0, A1 so that a set S belongs to I if and only if S ≤T A0
and S ≤T A1.
Membership in such an ideal is then Σ03(A0 ⊕ A1), and the ideal can be identified
with the set of pairs of indices 〈e0, e1〉 so that ΦA0e0 and Φ
A1
e1
are both total and
equal. The choice of A0 and A1 here is not canonical in any way, but in the sequel
we shall implicitly assume that whenever an ideal I is mentioned a choice of A0
and A1 has been made. (Formally, this means different choices of exact pairs give
different ideals, even if they are the same as collections of sets.) For simplicity,
we suppress mention of A0 and A1 when possible: for instance, given n ∈ ω, we
write Σ0n(I) instead of Σ
0
n(A0⊕A1). In a similar spirit, we call I arithmetical if A0
and A1 are arithmetical sets.
Recall the following standard terminology.
Definition 2.3.
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(1) A Mathias condition is a pair of sets (D,S) with D finite, S infinite,
and maxD < minS.
(2) A condition (D˜, S˜) extends a condition (D,S), written (D˜, S˜) ≤ (D,S),
if D ⊆ D˜ ⊆ D ∪ S and S˜ ⊆ S.
(3) A set A satisfies a condition (D,S) if D ⊆ A ⊆ D ∪ S.
(4) A set A meets a collection C of conditions if it satisfies a condition in C .
(5) A set A avoids a collection C of conditions if it satisfies a condition having
no extension in C .
We next define the restriction of Mathias forcing to a particular ideal.
Definition 2.4. Let I be an ideal.
(1) An I-condition is a Mathias condition (D,S) such that S ∈ I.
(2) For each n ∈ ω, a set G is n-I-generic if G meets or avoids every Σ0n(I)-
definable collection of I-conditions.
(3) A set G is I-generic if it is n-I-generic for all n ∈ ω.
Cholak, Dzhafarov, Hirst, and Slaman [2, Proposition 2.4] showed that for each n ≥
2, there exists an n-COMP -generic set G with G′ ≤T ∅(n). The argument easily
lifts to more general ideals I, yielding n-I-generics with G′ ≤T I(n). We leave the
verification to the reader. As discussed in Section 2 of [2], it is generally only of
interest to consider n-generics for n ≥ 3.
The forcing language over an ideal I is the usual language of second-order arith-
metic augmented by a parameter G˙ for the generic set, but with the modification
that it also includes a parameter for I, which is to say, for the exact pair chosen
for I. The forcing relation can then be defined in the usual manner (see, e.g., [2],
Section 3).
3. Basic results
We begin by collecting a few basic facts about Mathias generics over arbitrary
ideals, which also serve as preliminary results that we shall expound upon in sub-
sequent sections. To begin, we have the following generalization of the well-known
fact that Mathias generics are high (see, e.g., [1], Lemma 6.6, or [3], Section 5.1).
For a set A, let pA denote the principal function of A.
Proposition 3.1. Let I be an ideal and G a 3-I-generic. Then pG dominates
every function in I.
Proof. Fix any function f ∈ I, and let C be the collection of all I-conditions (D,S)
such that pS majorizes f . Note that C is Σ
0
3(I)-definable, and that it is in fact
dense. (To see this, consider any I-condition (D,S). Define S˜ ⊆ S inductively
by letting S˜(i) be the least element of S larger than f(i) and all S˜(j) for j < i.
Then S˜ ≤T f ⊕ S, so S˜ belongs to I, and (D, S˜) belongs to C .) We conclude that
any 3-I-generic set G meets C , so pG dominates f . 
Our next results concern the computational strength of generics, which shall be
the focus of Section 4.
Proposition 3.2. Let I be an ideal and A any set not in I. Then there exists a
Mathias I-generic set that does not compute A.
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Proof. We obtain a generic G by building a sequence of I-conditions (D0, S0) ≥
(D1, S1) ≥ · · · with lims |Ds| = ∞, and setting G =
⋃
sDs. Let (D0, S0) = (∅, ω),
and assume that for some s ≥ 0 we have defined (Ds, Ss).
If s is even, we work to make G not compute A. Say s = 2e. Ask if there
exists a finite set F ⊆ Ss and an x such that Φ
Ds∪F
e (x) ↓6= A(x). If so, choose
some such F and x and let Ds+1 = Ds ∪ F and Ss+1 = Ss − {y : y < ϕDs∪Fe (x)}.
(Here, ϕDs∪Fe (x) denotes the use of the computation Φ
Ds∪F
e (x).) Now G will sat-
isfy (Ds+1, Es+1), and thus Φ
G
e will converge on x and differ from A(x), ensuring
that G does not compute A via Φe. If, on the other hand, no such F and x ex-
ist, let (Ds+1, Ss+1) = (Ds, Ss). In this case, it cannot be that Φ
G
e is total, as
otherwise Ss would compute A, contradicting that A /∈ I.
If s is odd, we work to make G be I-generic. Say s = 2e + 1, and let C be
the eth member in some fixed listing of all arithmetical collections of I-conditions.
Let (Ds+1, Ss+1) be any extension of (Ds, Ss) in C , if such exists, and otherwise
let (Ds+1, Ss+1) = (Ds, Ss). Thus, G will either meet or avoid C , as needed. 
We pause here to present a classical computability-theoretic consequence of the
above results. Recall that by Martin’s high domination theorem, a set A is high,
i.e., satisfies A′ ≥T ∅′′, if and only if pA dominates every computable function.
The left-to-right direction of this result relativizes in the following simple form:
for any set L, if A′ ≥T L′′ then pA dominates every L-computable function. The
converse is false, as can be shown directly, but we obtain here the following new
simple proof of this fact. (The correct relativization of the right-to-left direction
of Martin’s result is as follows: for any set L, if pA dominates every L-computable
function then (A⊕ L)′ ≥T L′′.)
Corollary 3.3. There exist sets L and G such that G dominates every L-computable
function, but G′ T L′′.
Proof. Suppose not. Let L be any low c.e. set, and I the principal ideal below L.
LetM be any low c.e. set not computable from L, and by Proposition 3.2, let G be
any 3-I-generic that does not compute M . By the limit lemma, fix a computable
function Mˆ in two arguments that approximates M in the limit.
By Proposition 3.1, G dominates every L-computable function, so by assump-
tion, G′ ≥T L′′. But as L and M are low, L′′ ≡T ∅′′ ≡T M ′′, and so G′ ≥T M ′′.
It follows that G dominates every M -computable function, and so in particular G
dominates the weak modulus of Mˆ , defined by
w(x) = (µs)[Mˆ(x, s) =M(x)]
for all x. As M is c.e., this means M is computable from G, a contradiction. 
One motivation for us in this paper is the question of which ideals satisfy the
converse of Proposition 3.2: that is, for which ideals I is it the case that for some n,
every n-I-generic computes every set A ∈ I?
Definition 3.4. Fix n ∈ ω. An ideal I is n-generically-coded if every n-I-generic
set G computes every A ∈ I.
We can find many natural examples of generically-coded ideals. Recall the following
definition: a function f is called a modulus for a set A if A is computable from every
function g that majorizes f . By a result of Solovay [14, Theorem 2.3], a set has a
modulus if and only if it is hyperarithmetic.
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Lemma 3.5 (Folklore). If A is any ∆0n set, n ≥ 2, then A has a (∅
(n−2) ⊕ A)-
computable modulus.
Proof. Fix a ∅(n−2)-computable function Aˆ in two arguments that approximates A
in the limit. Let f be the (∅(n−2)⊕A)-computable function mapping each n to the
least s ≥ n such that Aˆ(x, s) = A(x) for all x ≤ n. Now from any g ≥ f we can
compute A as follows. Given n, we search for an s ≥ n such that Aˆ(n, t) = A(n, s)
for all t with s ≤ t ≤ g(s). This exists, since for instance any s after the stage at
which Aˆ has settled on n would do. In particular, s ≤ f(s) ≤ g(s), so Aˆ(n, s) =
Aˆ(n, f(s)). But since n ≤ s, we have Aˆ(n, f(s)) = A(n), so Aˆ(n, s) = A(n). We
conclude that f is a modulus for A. 
Proposition 3.6. Let I be an ideal and G a 3-I-generic. If ∅(n−2) ∈ I for
some n ≥ 2, then G computes every ∆0n set A ∈ I.
Proof. Assume that G computes ∅(m−2) for some m ≤ n, and suppose A ∈ I
is ∆0m. By Lemma 3.5, A has a (∅
(m−2) ⊕ A)-computable modulus for A. Since
∅(m−2) ≤T ∅(n−2) and ∅(n−2) ∈ I, it follows that this modulus belongs to I. By
Proposition 3.1, G dominates this modulus and so computes A. If m < n, this
means in particular that G computes ∅(m−1), so by induction, G computes ∅(n−2).
Hence, G computes every ∆0n set in I, as desired. 
Corollary 3.7. If I is the ideal generated by a union of principal ideals [A]≤T such
that A satisfies ∅(n) ≤T A ≤T ∅(n+1) for some n ∈ ω, then I is 3-generically-coded.
Proof. Let A be any member of I. Then there are sets A0, . . . , Ak−1 such that
A ≤T A0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Ak−1, where [A0]≤T , . . . , [A]
≤T
k−1 are among the principal ideals
that generate I. Let n be largest such that ∅(n) ≤T Ai ≤T ∅(n+1) for some i < k.
Then ∅(n) ∈ I and A ≤T ∅(n+1), so by the preceding proposition, we have that
every 3-I-generic computes A. 
Corollary 3.8. Every ∆02 ideal is 3-generically-coded, as is every principal ideal of
the form [∅(n)]≤T , n ∈ ω.
The next section is devoted to proving that the last corollary cannot be extended
to general ∆0n ideals if n ≥ 3.
4. Generics and computation
We address the question of which other ideals are generically-coded. That this
is not so for all ideals can be seen as follows. Soare [12] exhibited a set A not
computable from any of its co-infinite subsets. Let I = [A]≤T , and let G be
any I-generic satisfying the condition (∅, A). Then G ⊆ A, and genericity ensures
that A − G is infinite, so G does not compute A, as desired. Unfortunately, this
example leaves a considerable gap between the complexities of ideals that are and
are not generically-coded. Indeed, no arithmetical set satisfies Soare’s theorem,
as the degrees of subsets of infinite arithmetical set are closed upwards (see, e.g.,
Jockusch [7], Lemma 1.) Hence, the resulting ideal is not arithmetical either.
In what follows, we give an example of a non-generically-coded ∆03 ideal. We
shall employ the following definition.
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Definition 4.1. Let I be an ideal and A any set. Say a set S is I-hereditarily
uniformly A-computing if the infinite subsets of S in I uniformly compute A, i.e.,
if there is an e ∈ ω such that ΦTe = A for every infinite T ⊆ S in I.
The notion is motivated by the concept of uniform introreducibility introduced by
Jockusch [6, Section 2]. Recall that an infinite set is (uniformly) introreducible if it
is (uniformly) computable from each of its infinite subsets. Every degree contains a
uniformly introreducible set, namely, the set of codes of all initial segments of any
member of that degree.
Proposition 4.2. Let I be an ideal and A any ∆0n(I) set, n ≥ 3. If G is n-
I-generic and G ≥T A then G is contained in an I-hereditarily uniformly A-
computing set S ∈ I.
Proof. Fix e∗ ∈ ω such that ΦGe∗ = A. Since n ≥ 3, G must satisfy some condition
(D∗∗, S∗∗) forcing ΦG˙e∗ to be total, which means that (D
∗∗, S∗∗) avoids the set of
conditions (D,S) such that
∃x ∀ finite sets D′ ∀s [D ⊆ D′ ⊆ D ∪ S → ΦD
′
e∗,s(x) ↑].
Let C be the collection of all conditions (D,S) such that
∃x ∃s [ΦDe∗,s(x) ↓6= A(x)],
which is Σ0n(I)-definable since A is ∆
0
n(I). By genericity, G must consequently
avoid this collection, say via a condition (D∗, S∗). Without loss of generality, we
may assume (D∗, S∗) ≤ (D∗∗, S∗∗). Let S = D∗ ∪ S∗, and let e ∈ ω be the index
of the functional that, on input x, searches its oracle for the least finite subset F
such that minF ≥ minS∗ and
ΦD
∗∪F
e∗ (x) ↓ = v
for some value v ∈ {0, 1}, and then returns this value. We claim that S is I-
hereditarily uniformly A-computing, as witnessed by e. Since G ⊆ S and S ∈ I,
this gives the desired conclusion.
To prove the claim, fix any infinite T ⊆ S in I. If for some x there were no finite
subset F of T with minF ≥ minS∗ and ΦD
∗∪F
e∗ (x) ↓, then (D
∗, T ∩ S∗) would be
an I-extension of (D∗, S∗) (and hence of (D∗∗, S∗∗)) forcing ΦG˙e∗(x) ↑, which cannot
be. Hence, ΦTe is total, by definition of e. Similarly, if for some x there were such
an F with ΦD
∗∪F
e∗ (x) ↓6= A(x) then (D
∗ ∪ F, T ∗), where T ∗ is the set of elements
of T ∩ S∗ larger than maxF and the use of ΦD
∗∪F
e∗ (x), would be an extension of
(D∗, S∗) in C . Hence, we also have ΦTe = A. 
The following corollary extends Proposition 2.8 of [2], where it appears for the
special case of I = COMP . (Compare also with Proposition 3.2.)
Corollary 4.3. Let I be an ideal and G an n-I-generic, n ≥ 3. Then every ∆0n(I)
set computable from G belongs to I.
Proof. By the preceding proposition, if A ≤T G is ∆0n then in particular I contains
an I-hereditarily uniformly A-computing set, so A ∈ I. 
We now have the following somewhat technical lemma. For simplicity of no-
tation, we shall assume here that all computations are {0, 1}-valued, and that all
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domains of convergence are closed downwards. Given a condition (D,S), a fi-
nite set F , and e ∈ ω, we shall write F ⊆ Φ
(D,S)
e to mean that ΦDe converges
on ω ↾ maxF + 1 with use bounded by minS, and that F is contained in the fi-
nite set given by this computation. So, if F ⊆ Φ
(D,S)
e then F ⊆ Φ
(D˜,S˜)
e for every
(D˜, S˜) ≤ (D,S), and also F ⊆ ΦUe for any U satisfying (D,S) such that Φ
U
e is total.
Lemma 4.4. Let I be an ideal, (D∗, S∗) an I-condition, and F ∗ a finite set such
that F ∗ ⊆ Φ
(D∗,S∗)
e for some e ∈ ω. Fix i ∈ ω and let C be the collection of
conditions (D,S) satisfying one of the following properties:
(1) (D,S) forces that ΦG˙e is not total, not infinite, or not contained in G˙;
(2) there is an x such that ΦF
∗∪F
i (x) ↑ for all finite F ⊆ S;
(3) there is an x ≤ maxD and a finite F ⊆ Φ
(D,S)
e with maxF ∗ < minF such
that ΦF
∗∪F
i (x) ↓6= D(x).
Then C is dense below (D∗, S∗). Moreover, if I = COMP , then an index for
an extension in C of a given (D,S) ≤ (D∗, S∗), along with which of the above
alternatives it satisfies, can be determined uniformly ∅′′-computably from an index
for (D,S).
Proof. Call a condition (D,S) good if the following facts are true:
• for all finite F ⊆ S and all x ∈ ω, if ΦD∪Fe (x) ↓ = 1 then x ∈ D ∪ F ;
• for each s ∈ ω, there is a finite F ⊆ S and an x > s with ΦD∪Fe (x) ↓ = 1.
Note that if (D,S) is good, then the F and x in the second item above can be found
uniformly S-computably, and F may be chosen to be non-empty. By iterating this
construction, we can thus S-computably construct an infinite subset T of S such
that ΦD∪Te is infinite and contained inD∪T . We denote this S-computable subset T
of S by SD.
If (D,S) is not good, we can define an extension of it satisfying alternative 1 in
the definition of C , as follows. If there is a finite set F ⊆ S such that ΦD∪Fe (x) ↓ = 1
for some x /∈ D ∪ F , let D˜ = D ∪ F , and let S˜ consist of the elements of S larger
than x, the maximum of D ∪ F , and the use of the computation ΦD∪Fe (x). Then
(D˜, S˜) extends (D,S) and forces that ΦG˙e is not contained in G˙. If, instead, there
is an s such that either ΦD∪Fe (x) ↑ or Φ
D∪F
e (x) ↓ = 0 for all finite sets F ⊆ S and
x > s, then (D,S) itself forces that ΦG˙ is not total or not infinite. In this case, let
(D˜, S˜) = (D,S).
Now to prove the density of C , fix any condition (D,S) ≤ (D∗, S∗). We wish to
exhibit an extension of (D,S) in C , and so, by the preceding observation, we may
assume (D,S) and all its extensions are good. (This is equivalent to saying that
(D,S) forces that ΦG˙e is total, infinite, and contained in G˙.)
Since all extensions of (D,S) are good, we can define the following sequence of
infinite subsets of S:
• S0 = SD;
• S1 = ΦD∪S0e − {x
∗}, where x∗ is the least x > maxD in ΦD∪S0e ;
• S2 = (S1)D;
• S3 = ΦD∪S2e .
Thus, we have
S ⊇ S0 ⊇ S1 ⊇ S2 ⊇ S3,
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and the number x∗ belongs to S0 (since Φ
D∪S0
e ⊆ S0) but not to S2. In other words,
for v ∈ {0, 1}, we have S2v(x∗) = 1− v. There are now two cases.
Case 1. There is no finite F ⊆ S3 such that ΦF
∗∪F
i (x
∗) ↓. Then (D,S3) is an
extension of (D,S) satisfying alternative 2 in the definition of C , witnessed by x∗.
Case 2. Otherwise. In this case, choose F ⊆ S3 and v ∈ {0, 1} such that ΦF
∗∪F
i (x
∗) ↓=
v. Thus,
ΦF
∗∪F
i (x
∗) ↓ = v 6= S2v(x
∗) = (D ∪ S2v)(x
∗),
with the last equality holding because x∗ is bigger than maxD. Since (D,S2v) is
good, there is an initial segment D˜ of D ∪ S2v long enough so that
• x∗ ≤ max D˜ and D˜(x∗) = S2v(x∗), and
• ΦD˜e converges on ω ↾maxF + 1.
Let S˜ consist of the elements of S2v larger than max D˜ and the use of Φ
D˜
e on ω ↾
maxF + 1. Thus, F ⊆ Φ
(D˜,S˜)
e . Finally, since (D,S) extends (D∗, S∗) and is good,
we have
F ∗ ⊆ Φ(D,S)e ↾maxF
∗ + 1 ⊆ D,
so maxF ∗ < minF since F ⊆ S3 ⊆ S. We conclude that x∗ and F witness that
(D˜, S˜) satisfies alternative 3 in the definition of C .
To complete the proof, suppose I = COMP . Now ∅′′ can determine whether
or not a condition is good, and can differentiate between Cases 1 and 2. Thus, the
only step in the argument that cannot be performed by ∅′′ is the determination
of whether or not all extensions of (D,S) are good, which we just assumed above.
We can modify the proof to fix this difficulty as follows. Initially, we ask if (D,S)
is good, and if not, we can define an appropriate extension of (D,S) that meets
alternative 1 in the definition of C ), and are done. Otherwise, we can define S0 and
S1 as before. Now we ask if (D,S1) is good, and if not, we can argue as before, and
are again done. Otherwise, we can define S2 and S3, and the rest of the argument
is unchanged. It is easy to see that the proof is thus uniform in ∅′′. 
Theorem 4.5. Let I be an ideal and G a 3-I-generic. Then no 3-[G]≤T -generic
set contained in G computes G.
Proof. We show that each infinite G-computable subset of G has an infinite subset
that is computable from G, but does not compute G via a prescribed functional.
That is, for all e, i ∈ ω, we build a set Ae,i ≤T G to satisfy the following requirement:
Re,i : if Φ
G
e is an infinite subset of G, then Ae,i is an infinite subset of Φ
G
e and
Φ
Ae,i
i 6= G.
In other words, the set G has no [G]≤T -hereditarily uniformly G-computing sub-
set in the ideal [G]≤T . By Proposition 4.2, it follows that no 3-[G]≤T -generic set
satisfying the [G]≤T -condition (∅, G) can compute G, which is the desired result.
So fix e. If ΦGe is not infinite or not contained in G, there is nothing to do, and
we can let Ae,i = ∅ for all i. Otherwise, by 3-I-genericity of G, we can find an I-
condition (D∗, S∗) satisfied by G forcing that ΦG˙e is total, infinite, and contained
in G˙. In the parlance of Lemma 4.4, this means that (D∗, S∗) and all its extensions
are good. Let F ∗ = ∅, and let C be the dense collection of conditions of the
lemma. This is a Σ02(I)-definable collection, and so G must meet it, say via some
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(D,S) ≤ (D∗, S∗). By choice of (D∗, S∗), it cannot be that (D,S) satisfies the first
alternative in the definition of C . Hence, one of the following is true:
• there an x such that ΦFi (x) ↑ for all finite F ⊆ S;
• there is an x ≤ maxD and a finite F ⊆ Φ
(D,S)
e such that ΦFi (x) ↓6= D(x).
In the first case, we may take Ae,i = {x ∈ ΦGe : x ≥ minS}, as in this case, Φ
U
i
cannot be total for any U ⊆ S. In the second case, we may take Ae,i = F ∪ {x ∈
ΦGe : x ≥ minS}, as then we have
Φ
Ae,i
i (x) ↓ = Φ
F
i (x) ↓6= D(x) = G(x).
Obviously, Ae,i ≤T ΦGe , so Ae,i is G-computable and thus belongs to [G]
≤T . 
Taking I = COMP , and letting G be a 3-I-generic computable in ∅(3), the
theorem immediately yields the existence of a ∆04 ideal, namely [G]
≤T , that is
not n-generically-coded for any n ≥ 3. By Corollary 3.8, we cannot improve this to
∆02 ideals, but we can improve it to ∆
0
3 ones by a slightly more careful argument.
Thus, we get a sharp dividing line in terms of which arithmetical ideals are and are
not generically-coded.
Proposition 4.6. There is a principal ∆03 ideal which is not n-generically-coded
for any n ≥ 3.
Proof. Let I = COMP . The proof is roughly the same as that of Theorem 4.5, and
we build the sets Ae,i to satisfy the same requirements as there. The only difference
is that we now need to explicitly construct the set G. To this end, we build a
sequence of I-conditions (D0, S0) ≥ (D1, S1) ≥ · · · by stages, and let G =
⋃
sDs.
At stage 0, we let (D0, S0) = (∅, ω). We define Ae,i at stage s + 1 = 〈e, i〉, at
which we assume we have already defined (Ds, Ss). Applying Lemma 4.4 with
(D∗, S∗) = (Ds, Ss) and F
∗ = ∅, we let (Ds+1, Ss+1) be the extension of (Ds, Ss) in
C given by the lemma. If (Ds+1, Ss+1) satisfies the first alternative in the definition
of C , then it forces that ΦG˙e is not total, not infinite, or not contained in G˙. It is not
difficult to check that this fact will be true of any set that satisfies (Ds+1, Ss+1),
and so in particular of G, even though we are not making G even 3-generic. Thus,
ΦGe will not be an infinite subset of G in [G]
≤T , so we need not worry about it. In
this case, we can set Ae,i = ∅. Otherwise, (Ds+1, Ss+1) will satisfy one of the other
two alternatives in the definition of C , and then the argument can proceed as in
the theorem. By the effectiveness of Lemma 4.4, the construction can be performed
computably in ∅′′, so G will be ∆03. 
One further consequence of the above is the following purely computability-
theoretic result. Slaman and Groszek (unpublished) showed that there is a ∆03 set
with no modulus of the same degree. We obtain the analogous result for introre-
ducibility. In fact, it is easy to see that if an infinite set has a modulus of the same
degree then it also has an introreducible subset of the same degree, but of course
not conversely. Thus, the following is in fact an extension of their result, albeit
using a very different argument. The ∆03 bound here is sharp: it is easy to see that
every ∆02 set has a modulus of the same degree.
Proposition 4.7. There is a ∆03 set G with no infinite introreducible subset of the
same degree.
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Proof. We show that every infinite G-computable subset of G has an infinite subset
of its own that does not compute G. (The latter subsets will only be computable
in the construction, and hence in ∅′′, but not necessarily in G.) To this end, we
modify the proof of Proposition 4.6. Instead of building, for each e, a separate
subset Ae,i of Φ
G
e for each i and ensuring that Ae,i does not compute G via Φi, we
build a single subset Ae to satisfy the following requirement:
Re : if ΦGe is an infinite subset of G, then Ae is an infintie subset of Φ
G
e and
G T Ae.
We build the sets Ae by stages along with G, and let Fe,s be the initial segment to Ae
built at stage s. Initially, we let Fe,0 = ∅ for all e. At stage s+1 = 〈e, i〉, we are then
given (Ds, Ss) along with Fe,s, and we assume inductively that Fe,s ⊆ Φ
(Ds,Ss)
e . We
now apply Lemma 4.4 with (D∗, S∗) = (Ds, Ss) and F
∗ = Fe,s to get an extension
(D,S) of (Ds, Ss) in C . We consider three cases.
Case 1: (D,S) satisfies the first alternative in the definition of C . In this case, we
do not have to worry about ΦGe being an infinite subset of G, so we also do not have
worry about making Ae infinite. We thus set Fe,s+1 = Fe,s and (Ds+1, Ss+1) =
(D,S).
Case 2: (D,S) satisfies the second alternative in the definition of C but not the
first. Since (D,S) does not satisfy the first alternative, it does not force that ΦG˙e is
not infinite, so we can find an x > maxFe,s and an extension (D˜, S˜) of (D,S) such
that Fe,s ∪ {x} ⊆ Φ
(D˜,S˜)
e . We let Fe,s+1 = Fe,s ∪ {x} and (Ds+1, Ss+1) = (D˜, S˜).
Since (D,S) satisfies the second alternative, we know that ΦUi cannot be total for
any set U extending Fe,s, and so also for any set extending Fe,s+1.
Case 3: otherwise. In this case, (D,S) satisfies the third alternative in the definition
of C , so we can fix a finite set F ⊆ Φ
(Ds+1,Ss+1)
e with maxFe,s < minF witnessing
this fact. Since (D,S) does not satisfy the first alternative, we can pass to an
extension if necessary to add an element to F . Thus, without loss of generality, we
may assume F 6= ∅. We let Fe,s+1 = Fe,s ∪ F and (Ds+1, Ss+1) = (D,S).
It is easy to verify that for each e ∈ ω, the construction at stages s + 1 = 〈e, i〉
ensures the satisfaction of requirementRe. And as in our previous result, the entire
construction can be carried out by ∅′′, so G is ∆03. 
We finish this section with a converse to Proposition 4.2. We do not know
whether the level of genericity below can be improved from 4 to 3. This is because
deciding Σ03 facts in general requires Mathias 4-genericity (see [2], Lemma 3.3),
rather than 3-genericity as in the case of Cohen forcing.
Proposition 4.8. Let I be an ideal and A any set. If G is 4-I-generic and con-
tained in a set S ∈ I such that each infinite subset of S in I has an I-hereditarily
uniformly A-computing subset in I then G ≥T A.
Proof. Suppose every subset of S in I has an I-hereditarily uniformly A-computing
subset in I. Then in particular, A belongs to I, so the formula
(1) ∃e ∀x [ΦG˙e (x) ↓ = A(x)]
is equivalent to a Σ03(I) one. Since G is 4-I-generic and contained in S, there must
be some I-condition (D∗, S∗) ≤ (∅, S) satisfied by G that decides this formula.
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This means S∗ ⊆ S, so by passing to an extension if necessary we may assume S∗
is itself I-hereditarily uniformly A-computing subset in I, say witnessed by e∗ ∈ ω.
Let e ∈ ω be the index of the functional defined by
ΦUe = Φ
U−D∗
e∗
for all oracles U . Now if (D∗, S∗) forced the negation of (1), then some exten-
sion (D∗∗, S∗∗) of it would, for some x ∈ ω, either force ΦG˙e (x) ↑ or else Φ
G˙
e (x) 6=
A(x). In the former case, there could be no finite F ⊆ S∗∗ such that ΦD
∗∗∪F
e (x) ↓,
so in particular ΦD
∗∗∪S∗∗
e could not be total. In the latter, it would have to be
that ΦD
∗∗
e (x) ↓6= A(x) with use bounded by minS
∗∗, so also ΦD
∗∗∪S∗∗
e (x) ↓6= A(x).
But ΦD
∗∗∪S∗∗
e = Φ
S∗∗
e∗ = A, so neither of these cases can be true. We conclude
that (D∗, S∗) forces (1), and hence by genericity that G ≥T A. 
Corollary 4.9. Let I be an ideal and A any ∆0n(I) set, n ≥ 4. The following are
equivalent for any n-I-generic G:
(1) G ≥T A;
(2) G is contained in an I-hereditarily uniformly A-computing set S ∈ I.
Proof. The implication from (1) to (2) is Proposition 4.2, and the implication from
(2) to (1) follows by Proposition 4.8 and the fact that being I-hereditarily uni-
formly A-computing is closed under infinite subset. 
Corollary 4.10. Let I be an ideal and A any ∆0n set, n ≥ 4. Then the following
are equivalent:
(1) every n-I-generic G computes A;
(2) every set in I has an I-hereditarily uniformly A-computing subset in I.
Proof. For the implication from (1) to (2), suppose every n-I-generic computes A.
Let S be any member of I, and choose an n-I-genericG satisfying (∅, S). By Propo-
sition 4.2, G is contained in some I-hereditarily uniformly A-computing set S∗ ∈ I.
Then S∩S∗ is an I-hereditarily uniformly A-computing subset of S in I. The impli-
cation from (2) to (1) is Proposition 4.8 and the fact that every generic is contained
in some member of I. 
5. Generics for different ideals
In this section we examine relationships between Mathias generic sets for different
ideals. We ask how the ideals must relate in order for the generics to relate. We
first establish some basic properties of ideals that will be useful to us in this section.
Given two sets A and S, define
UA,S = {pS(pA ↾ iq) : i ∈ ω},
where pA ↾ iq denotes the canonical index of the finite set A ↾ i. Thus, UA,S picks
out a subset of S according to indices of initial segments of A.
Lemma 5.1. Let A be any set, and suppose I is an ideal containing a set S.
If UA,S has an infinite subset in I, then A belongs to I.
Proof. Suppose U ⊆ UA,S belongs to I. Then U is a subset of S, so for each i
we can uniformly compute from U ⊕ S an x such that pU (i) = pS(x). But by
the definition of UA,S , this x must be pA ↾ jq for some j ≥ i. In other words,
given i, U ⊕S can uniformly find a canonical index for a finite initial segment of A
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of size at least i. Since A is computable from any infinite sequence of its initial
segments, we conclude that A ≤T U ⊕ S. Since I is an ideal and U, S ∈ I belong
to I, it follows that A ∈ I. 
Proposition 5.2. If I ⊆ J are ideals such that every infinite set in J has an
infinite subset in I, then I = J .
Proof. If J = ∅ there is nothing to prove, so assume otherwise and fix any infi-
nite A ∈ J . We shall show that A ∈ I. By assumption, we may fix an infinite S ∈ I.
Then UA,S is computable from S ⊕ A and hence belongs to the ideal J . By as-
sumption, UA,S has an infinite subset in I, so A belongs to I by the lemma. 
Proposition 5.3. If I ⊆ J are arithmetical ideals and I 6= J , then there is
an I-generic set that, for some n ∈ ω, computes no n-J -generic set.
Proof. Let C be the collection of all J -conditions (E, T ) such that T has no infinite
subset in I. We claim this set is dense in the J -conditions. Indeed, fix any J -
condition (E, T ), and let A be any infinite set in J − I. Then UA,T is an infinite
subset of T in J , and since A /∈ I it follows by the lemma that UA,T has no infinite
subset in I. Hence, (E,UA,T ) is an extension of (E, T ) in C .
Since I and J are arithmetical, there is some n such that every n-J -generic set
meets C . Our goal, then, is to construct an I-generic set G such that for all e,
either ΦGe is not an infinite set or Φ
G
e avoids C . This G will therefore not compute
any n-J -generic, as desired. We shall obtain G in the usual way, as
⋃
sDs from a
suitably constructed sequence of I-conditions (D0, S0) ≥ (D1, S1) ≥ · · · . List the
elements of C as (E0, T0), (E1, T1), . . .. Let (D0, S0) = (∅, ω), and assume that for
some s ≥ 0 we have defined (Ds, Ss).
If s is even, we work to make G not compute any n-J -generic. More specifically,
say s = 2〈e, i〉. We work to either make ΦGe not be an infinite set, or to make Φ
G
e
not meet C via satisfying (Ei, Ti). To this end, ask if there exists a finite set F ⊆
Ss and an x /∈ Ei ∪ Ti such that ΦDs∪Fe (x) ↓ = 1. If so, choose some such F
and x and let Ds+1 = Ds ∪ F and Ss+1 = Ss − ϕDs∪Fe (x). Now since G will
satisfy (Ds+1, Es+1), we have that if Φ
G
e is a set, it will contain x and hence not
satisfy (Ei, Ti). If, on the other hand, no such F and x exist, let (Ds+1, Ss+1) =
(Ds, Ss). In this case, Φ
G
e cannot be an infinite set, as otherwise Ss would compute
an infinite subset of Ti and so contradict that Ti has no infinite subset in I.
If s is odd, proceed as in the analogous case in the proof of Proposition 3.2. 
In the ∆02 setting, we can now extend Proposition 5.3 to non-nested ideals.
Corollary 5.4. If I and J are ∆02 ideals with J * I, then there is an I-generic
set that computes no 3-J -generic.
Proof. Fix A ∈ J − I. By Corollary 3.8, every 3-J -generic set computes A, but
by Proposition 3.2, there is a I-generic set that does not. 
The analysis above naturally leads to the following question:
Question 5.5. If J ⊆ I then does every I-generic compute a 3-J -generic?
This question, although easily stated, is quite difficult to approach. For one
thing, one must take into account the complexity of the exact pair representing the
smaller ideal. Even if we restrict J to the ∆02 degrees, there are uncountably many
ideals of ∆02 degrees, and hence J could turn out to have only very complex exact
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pairs. We finish this article with a positive answer to the question above for the
simplest case, when J = COMP , the ideal of all computable sets.
Theorem 5.6. Let I be an ideal and let n ≥ 3 be a natural number. Every n-I-
generic computes an n-COMP -generic set.
We wish to thank Rose Weisshaar, who noticed an omission in the original proof
of this theorem. The proof presented below has been corrected.
Proof. We use the following idea from [2, Theorem 5.2]. For an arbitrary set A
we can approximate A(n) by approximating iterations of the jump of A . We let
A0[s0] = A ↾ s0. We fix a uniform way to approximate the jump of a set and by
induction define for all m ≤ n:
A(m)[s0, . . . , sm] = (A
(m−1)[s0, . . . , sm−1])
′[sm].
If X computes A then X computes A(n)[s0, . . . , sn] for all n. Furthermore, for all
x and e there are arbitrarily large stages s1, . . . , sn such that
A(n) ↾ x = A(n)[s0, . . . , sn] ↾ x
and for any c.e. set W :
WA
(n)
↾ x =WA
(n)[s0,...,sn] ↾ x.
These observations justify our adopting the following convention: when we write
A(m)[s0, . . . , sm] we shall always mean that s0 < · · · < sm.
LetG be an n-I-generic set. We describe a procedure which usesG as an oracle to
construct an n-COMP -generic set E. The procedure operates as follows: we view
G as a sequence of blocks each of size n+1. Let {Gm}m<ω be a partition of G into
finite pieces Gm, each of size n+1 and with the property that minGm+1 < maxGm.
We deal with each block Gm in turn and define a finite set Dm. The resulting set
E will then be
⋃
m<ωDm.
We fix a list of requirements: {Re}e<ω, where each Re states the following:
If Re =W
∅(n)
e is a set of conditions then E meets or avoids Re.
Consider a block Gm = {s0, . . . , sn}. We use this piece first to produce an
approximation to the sets ∅(p) for all p ≤ n using the approximating procedure de-
scribed above. Let ∅(p)[m] denote the set ∅(p)[s0, s1, . . . , sn]. The setDm is obtained
as follows: we construct a sequence α0, . . . , αk, where each αi has the structure of
a computable Mathias condition: it consists of a finite set Dαi and an index of
a partial computable function eαi . This sequence consists of attempts to satisfy
the requirements, performed at previous stages, based on previous approximations
using earlier blocks. During the current block action we preserve as much of the
sequence constructed so far that still seems to consist of actual conditions and pos-
sibly extend it one step further to satisfy a new requirement. We will, however,
computably ensure that Dαi ⊆ Dαi+1 for all i and set Dm = Dαk .
The first block G0 will produce the sequence with only one element α0 = (∅,N),
or to be precise (∅, e), where e is some fixed index of the characteristic function of
N. Suppose that the (m−1)-st block produces the sequence α0, . . . , αk and outputs
the set Dm−1. We now use the sparseness of G to check whether we still believe
that α0, . . . , αk is a sequence of conditions: Let t be the largest element in Gm and
suppose that t is the x-th element of the oracle G. Let Sαi,t = {y : ϕeαi ,t(y) ↓= 1}.
For every i, such that 0 < i < k we check whether:
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(1) ϕeαi converges on every element y < x in less than t steps with output 0
or 1;
(2) Sαi,t contains at least x many elements;
(3) The maximal element in Dαi is smaller than the minimal element in Sαi,t;
(4) Sαi,t ↾ x ⊆ Sαi−1,t;
If we reach an index j, such that αj+1 does not satisfy the requirements above,
then the sequence defined at block m will be α0, . . . , αj , β, where β = (Dm−1, eβ)
and eβ is the index of the function which outputs 0 on elements less than maxDm−1
and otherwise behaves like the function with index ej .
If the sequence defined at block m− 1 consists of valid Mathias conditions, i.e.
for every i < k we have that αi satisfies the properties above, then we try to extend
it to meet a requirement. Using the block m approximation to ∅(n), we search for
a least number e ≤ m such that
• Re is not satisfied by any member of the sequence α0, . . . , αk;
• there is an element (D, e) ∈ Re[m], such that (D, e) is a computable Mathias
condition which extends αk according to ∅′′[m];
• Dm−1 ⊆ D and for every element x ∈ D −Dm−1 we have that ϕeαk (x) is
defined in t = maxGm many steps and is equal to 1.
If there is such an e then we set αk+1 = (D, e). Otherwise we end the sequence at
αk. This completes the block m-action of the procedure.
It remains to show that the constructed set E =
⋃
mDm really satisfies each
requirement Re. We use G’s genericity for this. We can view the procedure that
we just described as a functional Γ, such that for every finite set F , ΓF is a sequence
α0, . . . , αk, where if m is the number of size-n+1 blocks that F can be partitioned
in then this sequence is obtained by the block-m action of the procedure with oracle
F .
Assume inductively that there is a condition (F0, T0), such that F0 ⊆ G ⊆ T0,
such that ΓF0 is a monotone sequence of true computable Mathias conditions, T0
is so sparse that it witnesses this and all requirements Ri for i < e are satisfied by
some member of this sequence.
For every finite monotone sequence ~α = α0 . . . αk, where αi = (Dαi , eαi) is a
pair of a finite set and an index of a partial computable function, consider the set
C~α consisting of all I-conditions (F, T ) such that T is so sparse that it witnesses
that ~α is a monotone sequence of computable Mathias conditions: for every i ≤ k
and every n ≥ |F |, if t is the n-th element of F ∪ T then:
(1) ϕeαi converges on every element y < x in less than t steps with output 0
or 1;
(2) Sαi,t = {y : ϕeαi ,t(y) ↓= 1} contains at least x many elements;
(3) the maximal element in Dαi is smaller than the minimal element in Sαi,t;
(4) if i > 0 then Sαi,t ↾ x ⊆ Sαi−1,t).
Note that if ~α is a monotone sequence of computable Mathias conditions, then C~α
is a dense set. In fact, to find an extension of a condition in C~α we only need to
thin the reservoir, i.e. for every (F, T ) there is an extension (F, T ′) ∈ C~α.
Consider the set C of conditions (F, T ) such that F0 ⊆ F and ΓF = ~α is a
sequence of computable Mathias conditions with a member in Re and T is sparse
enough to witness this: (F, T ) ∈ C~α. This set of conditions is Σn(I)-definable. If
G meets C via (F, T ) then E meets Re via one of the conditions in the sequence
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ΓF , because the sparseness of T guarantees that ΓF is an initial segment of ΓG↾l
for every extension G ↾ l of F .
Suppose that G avoids C via (F, T ). Without loss of generality we may assume
F0 ⊆ F . Consider ΓF and let α0, . . . , αk be the sequence defined by Γ during the
computation on the last block of F . Let j be the largest index such that α0, . . . , αj
is an initial segment of all further sequences defined at further blocks with oracle G.
Consider the block of G, say G ↾ l, where αj is the last condition in the computation
ΓG↾l. Suppose that αj has an extension β ∈ Re. Let (G ↾ l, T ∗) be an extension
of (F, T ) that is in Cα0,...αj ,β , such that for the first block s0 < s1 < · · · < sn of
T ∗ we have that β ∈ Re[s0, s1, . . . , sn] and furthermore for every x ∈ Dβ , x can be
verified to belong to Dαi ∪ Sαi in sn many steps.
Now let (F ′, T ′) be such that F ′ = G ↾ l ∪ s1, . . . , sn and T ′ is obtained from T ∗
by removing all elements less than or equal to sn. It follows that (F
′, T ′) extends
(F, T ) and belongs to C, contradicting our assumptions. Thus αj avoids Re. This
completes the proof. 
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